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Abstract 
77ie linear extension of the 'logic' of market, operation in the 
organized, sector to (he informal sector obfuscates the problem. 
The phenomena of high (often referred to as usurious) interest 
rate as well as the significant variation in interest rate and in 
credit contracts in the same market remain unexplained without 
the specific configurations of the property rights and the 
characteristics of the output market 
1. Introduction 
In those regions of the world which are yet to industrialize, 
the agrarian question has remained one of the central and 
abiding concerns. A central characteristic of economic 
backwardness is an unresolved agrarian question. It has, of 
course, different layers of meaning (see, e. g., Byres, 1991): as 
a political question regarding the attitude of the peasantry and 
their role in the transformation of an extant social formation; 
as the development of capitalism in the countryside, that is 
class formation in agriculture or the differentiation of the 
peasantry ; and, as capitalist industrialization, and overall 
capitalist transformation, that is as a major source of surplus 
for primitive accumulation. The agrarian question, however, 
corresponds to the historical formation of property rights of 
individuals over assets, which would define the mode of 
exchange of such rights and consequently the functioning of 
economic organizations, in a non-Walrasian system. 
Individual's rights to utilize, obtain income from, and 
alienate the asset define the property rights. Legal rights, as a 
rule, enhance economic rights, but the former are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the existence of the latter (Barzel, 
1989 : chp. 1). New rights are created in response to new 
economic forces (Demsetz, 1967). As the value of the lands 
enhances due to. especially, the increase in productivity 
economic forces tend to establish rights over it. Conversely, 
unless the gains from the holding of the property is worthwhile 
given the costs, the propensity to disown the property would be 
high, provided the alternative avenues of productive use of the 
liquidity holdings are wide open to the asset holder. It is in this 
sense that the regional attributes to the historical processes of 
agrarian development perhaps depict different modes of 
exchange—market and non -market—of property rights in 
different regions. Michie (1978), Sarap (1990), Swaminathan 
(1991), for instance, have studied the rural informal credit 
market in different regions in India, respectively, and come up 
with conflicting conclusions. This pertains perhaps more to the 
diversity of agrarian development and the corresponding 
redesigning of property rights rather than to mere differences 
in sample designs. 
The rights to an asset generating a flow of service are 
relatively easy to ensure when the flow can be readily ascertained 
(Barzel, 1989 : p.5). A known and constant flow ensure that 
rights are certain. In other words, the variability and 
predictability of the Jlow determines the degree to which the 
rights can be ensured. This has further implications for the 
exchange of rights. Unlike in the Walrasian general equilibrium 
framework, a new equilibrium is not instantaneously attained 
through a costless reallocation. The transaction costs associated 
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with the transfer and capture of property rights vary according 
as (a) the state, acting upon the social organizations, enacts 
laws to protect certain category of properties, (b) the historical 
processes of development of the social organizations vary, 
and (c) the conditions of production vary. 
There are different explanations of the persistence of 
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informal rural credit market, which can broadly be classified 
into : (a) the credit rationing in the formal sector leaves a gap 
to be complemented by the informal sector, (b) it actually 
reflects symptoms of underdevelopment, and (c) the type of 
collateral accepted as security by lenders and the purpose 
underlying demand for credit are the basis for the continuing 
segmentation of the credit market. Stiglitz (1989) and 
many others have emphasised the problems of information 
that manifest themselves in various forms of credit markets. 
Who are likely to be the defaulters ? Or, how to ensure 
repayments at stipulated times ? These are some of the 
considerations that force lenders to solve the problems of 
selection (screening loan applications) as well as enforcement 
of contract. This, as suggested by many, induces market 
interlinkage (land, labour, credit and output) in a way that 
benefits both the lender and the borrower (see, e.g., Bardhan, 
1980; Gangopadhyay, 1994). However, that does not provide 
us with a clue as to why the different exchange systems coexist. 
On the other hand, the process of agrarian development lies 
precisely in the changing nature and content of these contracts 
which reflect, in turn, the changing conditions and relations 
of production. 
The problem of dealing with non-competitive and non-
capitalist situations has been focussed more prominently in 
Bhaduri's two articles (1973, 1977). Bhaduri (1973) has 
attempted to explain the lender - borrower Interface in the 
Marxian framework of production relations.1 Since the 
persistence of usury (or, in brief, excessively high interest rate) 
requires that the borrowers are perennially short of their 
paddy requirements the semi-feudal production relations 
operate as a barrier to the introduction of improved technology 
that results in higher per capita output of the small tenants. 
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This, as suggested by Bhaduri (1977). explains agricultural 
backwardness in eastern India, particularly in Bihar and 
West Bengal. 
During the last 20 years, however, there have been 
considerable improvements in agricultural productivity in 
West Bengal. Yet the "traditional' credit contracts are extensively 
practised, standardized, and recognized. This may remind us 
the broader issues of capitalist industrialization and overall 
capitalist transformation that interlink the resolution of agrarian 
questions. To draw upon, colonial Korea, Taiwan, or India had 
experienced periodical productivity improvements in agriculture 
but there was not, in any sense, a capitalist agrarian transition 
inasmuch as there was no capitalist agriculture, no capitalist 
industrialization, no overall capitalist transformation (see Byres, 
1991). There was continuing primitive accumulation, but that 
was part of either Japanese or British capitalist development. 
The main explanations of the formation of high interest 
rates, in brief, are : (a) the lender's risk (Bottomley, 1963,1975),2 
(b) isolation as well as highly personalized nature of the 
agrarian capital (see. e. g., Bhaduri. 1977). and (c) credit 
rationing in the economy which fragments the market into 
formal and informal sectors (see. e. g., Tang. 1995). None of 
the explanations, however, by itself accounts for the significant 
variation in interest rate as well as other credit contracts in the 
same market. 
The linear extension of the 'logic' of market operation in the 
organized sector to the informal sector often obfuscate the 
problem. In the organized sector, though the degree may vary 
across development and underdevelopment, the market is 
relatively indifferent to social relations. This is no longer valid 
in the informal sector. It would be our endeavour to explain the 
phenomena of high interest rate as well as the significant 
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variation in interest rate and in credit contracts in the same 
market. The purpose of the paper is to show that without the 
specific configurations of the property rights and the 
characteristics of the local output markets any analysis of the 
informal rural credit market remains incomplete. Contrary 
to the perception that the tools of property rights may be best 
used to analyze the market economy, where allocation is 
performed largely if not entirely by prices, these tools seem to 
have more analytical power to explain resource allocation in 
non—market settings. 
The study is based on a survey carried out in the districts 
of Cooch Behar, Dinajpur, Malda, Birbhum and Murshidabad 
covering the prosperity enclave, intermediate region and laggard 
zones, both in terms of controlled irrigation and productivity 
in agrarian West Bengal, India. In the laggard zone, we have 
concentrated more in those households where farm and 
non-farm activities overlap each other, viz., sericulture (the 
production of silk). To note, the non-farm activities such as 
silk yarn reeling and spinning, cotton and silk handloom 
weaving, and bidi —indigenous variety of cigarette—binding, 
are relatively important. The prime emphasis was on collecting 
qualitative information through the participatory observation 
method.3 At a later stage, in order to quantify some of the 
observations, a stratified sample of villages and households 
(farm and non-farm) was selected to collect data on a few 
selected questions. Thus the conclusions are not always confined 
to the tables presented here. In Section II, the interlinked 
transactions have been studied. Section III deals with the credit 
market where the interest rate is explicit. In the concluding 
section some observations are made to put the analysis in 
perspective. 
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II The institution : the interlinked transactions 
There are five kinds of credit agreements : (a) both the 
borrowing and repayments in cash (in short. C-C), (b) borrowing 
in cash but repayment in kind (C-K). (c) both the borrowing and 
repayments in kind (K-K). (d) borrowing in cash but repayment 
with labour and/or. land (C-L), and (e) borrowing in kind and 
repayment in cash (K-C). Out of the 136 sample cases studied, 
it is found that about 60 per cent of the credit agreements 
were of the C-C type, followed by C-K (28. 7 per cent), K-K (6.6 
per cent), and C-L (5.15 per cent) (Table 1). We have not 
separately accounted for the K-C, since it is very widespread in 
rural economy. On the whole, however, there is significant 
regional variation, too in credit agreements, as is evident 
in Table 1. 
The regional pattern of variation shows that generally the 
commercial crop growing regions have developed a rather 
strong interlinkage between land, labour, credit and output 
markets. However, only in the two blocks (Nalhati and 
Rampurhat) in the district of Birbhum, the C-L interlinkage is 
found to be considerable (Table 1), although the region is not 
found to have any shortage of agricultural labour. The system 
of sharecropping though not uncommon in this region is less 
significant in the overall land-management practice, and the 
social hegemony of the landowning peasantry is comparatively 
more developed. The gradual consolidation of the irrigation 
infrastructure in this district of Birbhum, particularly since the 
development of the Mayurakshi system of canals during the 
1950s, led to the growth of a more intensive form of cultivation 
and gave rise to a relatively strong and active peasant community 
(Biswas and Bandyopadhyay, 1978). 
Generally, the substantial peasant cum lenders rather than 
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the professional lenders are inclined more towards loan 
agreements other than C-C type. There are two kinds of loan 
agreements with land as the collateral. First, is an agreement 
that allows the borrower to repay after one year against the 
usufructuary rights on the land. The volume of the credit is 
determined by the size and productivity of the lands. On an 
average, one bigha (i. e., 0. 33 acre) of land allows the owner 
a credit of Rs. 2,000, in this type of agreement. The borrower 
is supposed to perform everything from sowing to harvesting 
while the lender reaps the entire yields of the land during the 
year as repayment of the principal plus interest. The system is 
known as khay khalasl Suppose, the mortgaged land has a 
mulberry plantation. Generally, the yield of leaves on 0.33 acre 
enables one to rear 200-250 dfls ('disease free laying') of 
silkworm in a crop season, which turns out 60-70 kilos of 
cocoons whose market value would be Rs. 3,600-4,200. Giving 
allowances for crop losses, the lender's gross revenue would be 
at least Rs. 10,000 out of the four crops, in a year. Of course, 
the lender incurs the costs of rearing. Still, the cost-return 
calculations would show (Banerjee, 1990) that the margin is 
considerably higher than the amount the lender would have 
earned had the money been given at a seven per cent monthly 
(simple) interest rate,4 which is the average rate governing the 
C-C market. 
The other system of using cultivable lands as collateral 
closely resembles the system of leasing in or out. The loan 
amount against this kind of collateral varies with the market 
value of the lands. The lender enjoys the usufructuary rights on 
the lands so long as the principal remains unpaid. The produce 
of the land is treated as the interest payments. In this kind of 
agreement the borrower does not have to render free labour 
service. Usually, in this system, 0.33 acre of land enables its 
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owner to have a loan to the tune of Rs. 10,000/' The implicit 
interest rate turns out to be at least seven per cent per month; 
for commercial crops cultivation it would be more. The divergence 
of the price factor makes it difficult to calculate the precise rate 
of interest in these cases. 
However, the leasing in appears to be less economic than 
the khay khalasi for the lender. This has greater implications 
for productivity improvements in agriculture, in general. The 
easy opportunity to exploit both labour and land in the system 
of khay khalasi generally does not induce capital investments 
in improved cultivation by the risk aversed landed gentry cum 
lender. Further, in areas where there is perennial demand 
for credit from the common peasants, the system of khay 
khalasi, though it hinders the processes of land transfer and 
concentration, yet induces immiserization. 
While some people keep their lands mortgaged to have 
loans there are intermediaries who borrow from the lender to 
buy the usufructuary rights to lands from the actual borrowers. 
This happens when the lender refuses to accept any collateral 
other than gold, silver, or utensils, and the borrower could not 
offer collateral other than lands. The intermediary (usually, a 
landowning cultivator) because of his greater access to different 
kinds of collateral borrows funds at a stipulated interest rate 
from the professional moneylender (or, even from the organized 
sector banks) and extends the same to the ultimate borrower 
in exchange of usufructuary rights to his/her cultivable lands 
for at least a year. 
Secondly, the 'kind - kind' type of credit agreement is also 
quite common. Usually, rice or paddy are given as loan during 
pre-harvest for a period of two-three months or less than that, 
and one and a half times of the principal amount, irrespective 
of the repayment period, are required to be paid after harvest. 
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Tills is rather a highly personalized credit market: No collateral 
is required, but only those who cultivate land are entitled to this 
kind of credit, usually from the substantial peasants. Not-so-
long ago, this was one of the instruments through which land 
transfers took place at a significant scale from borrowers to the 
lenders, usually landed gentry, and also the professionals. 
However, this has transformed into a rather personalized 
market with the change in the property relations—the way in 
which land is owned, held and worked. Taking into account 
the difference between the pre-harvest (i.e., about Rs. 155 per 
40 kilos) and post-harvest (Rs. 125) prices, the implicit interest 
rate turns out to be about 10 per cent per month, for a grain 
loan for two months. It may be argued that since the amount 
to be repaid is independent of the length of the repayment 
period whether this type of credit could be considered as a loan 
in the formal sense; because the amount of interest paid 
per unit of time as a fraction of the balance becomes uncertain. 
But, the net gains from the transfer using of only subsets of 
the ownership of the commodities' attributes and retaining 
the rest by the original owner of commodities is not the 
Marshallian economic rent (as 'producer's surplus'), either. 
Besides, the default is penalized, at a compound rate of the 
original agreement. 
Thirdly, there is the cash-kind interlinkage in loan 
agreements. This is mostly been preferred by the local traders, 
who are known as mahajans. For instance, the jute trader 
extends loan to the jute cultivators on condition that they 
would sell their output to him, the yarn trader to the rearers or 
reelers, and likewise the silk goods trader to the weaver, and so 
on. The implicit rate of interest on credit transactions varies, 
sometimes distinctly, in each of the cases of product variation 
as well as their respective predictability—low mean and low 
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Variance, low mean and high Variance, and high mean with 
high Variance. However, the lender, generally does not impose 
any condition on the production-decision of the borrower. This 
is quite in contrast to what was evident during the colonial and 
immediate post-colonial period when the borrower's autonomy 
was severely restricted by this kind of interlinkage (see Banerjee. 
forthcoming : chp. 1). 
The borrowers, of course, are used to sell their outputs to 
the trader cum lender (mahajan) at a price considerably lower 
than the 'market' price. In areas where a considerable number 
of producers of a particular crop/product are indebted to the 
mahajans the post-hai^est price level tends to remain depressed 
in the market. This perhaps explains the results obtained by 
Palaskas and Harriss-White (1993) on the divergence of price 
in closely located rural markets. Thus, the more the indebtedness 
in a particular area more is the isolation of the specific market 
and the higher is the probability of not getting the right price 
by the producers, and thereby greater is the profit on alienation 
by 'buying cheap and selling dear'. 
Fourth, the K-C transaction is widespread in local retail 
trading. The local fertilizer dealer, for instance, enters into 
transactions-on-credit provided the fertilizer buyer is ready to 
pay a premium. And this rate tends to be almost equal to the 
prevailing explicit general interest rate per month in the local 
informal credit market. 
III. The institution : the market-type' transactions 
Unlike others, the C-C appears as a more formal kind of 
credit agreement. It is in this market that the professional 
lenders play crucial role. The degree of variation in the explicit 
rate of interest (a) by occupation of the borrowers, (b) by the 
purpose of the loan, and (c) by the types of collateral offered as 
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securities, is evident in Table 2. On the whole, the weighted 
average rate of interest is found to be more than seven per cent 
per month. Going by the occupation of the borrowers, it 
appears that the traders paid the highest interest (9%) while the 
reelers, as a group, paid the lowest (4%). To note, the daily 
labourers, the bidi binders, or the fishers get credit at a 
comparatively lower interest rate; of course, their size of credit 
is relatively small. Further, although the rate of return in silk 
cocoon rearing is higher than that in other economic activities 
considered here, except for trading, the average rate of interest 
paid by the rearers is relatively high (8.5%). Apparently, the 
determination of interest rates takes into account the return 
from different kinds of economic activities rather than 
the usually assumed risk involved in extending credit to 
different borrowers. 
The frequency distribution of the borrowers, according to 
different rates of interest paid, shows all sorts of variation. The 
risk and uncertainties in reeling, for instance, are quite high as 
the rural yarn market is not well formed (Banerjee, 1995b), 
yet more than half of the reelers were able to secure credit at 
an average rate of four per cent per month while rest of them 
paid a higher credit price (Table 2a). For credit taken towards 
investments in relatively more generalized agricultural 
commodity production (than sericulture is, at least in West 
Bengal) the average interest rate is found to be almost equal to 
that for domestic consumption purposes, and higher than that 
in sericulture (Table 2b). This deserves attention since adequate 
rainfall during the last couple of years, the extension of public 
as well as private irrigation, and the adoption of high-yielding 
varieties not only have reduced uncertainties but enhanced 
aggregate agricultural outputs in the state, as well. In contrast, 
the non-farm products because of their mostly non-generalized 
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nature are subject to non-market forces at a greater magnitude 
than the relatively generalized farm commodities are. This 
weaker bargaining power in the output market affects the 
primitive accumulation' of the non-farm producers, and 
consequently put them in perennial need of credit. In brief, it 
seems, 'risk' is a weak explanatory variable of the high interest 
rate. On the other hand, 'type of collateral' is found to have a 
good correlation with the interest rate, at the aggregate level 
(Table 2c). While it is about 10 per cent without any collateral 
the rate is lowest in the case of gold (in any acceptable form) as 
the collateral security. However, the ambiguity in the credit 
market is further evident in the same table: the same individual 
interest rate may hold good with any kind of collateral or no 
collateral at all.6 There is significant inter-, and intra-zonal 
variation, also (Table 1). 
Hypothetically, risk minimization is a direct function of 
tangible asset holdings of the borrower, provided asset transfer, 
is not restricted by certain laws of the country or region (for 
example, the lands owned by the tribal people are legally not 
transferable).7 However, as is evident, notwithstanding the 
same creditworthiness the interest rate varies significantly 
irrespective of the type of collateral offered (Table 4). There is no 
systematic pattern of association between the size of 
landholdings and interest rate; the average rate paid by, for 
instance, the borrowers in the size class of 0.5 - 1.0 acre is 
about six per cent while that by the borrowers in the class 
'above 3.0 acres' is more than 11 per cent per month (Table 4). 
As a measure of cross-checking, we try to estimate the 
following functional relationships, based on the understanding 
that the volume of loan and interest rate are equilibrium 
outcome : 
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I = f ( L. D, M ) (i) 
V = f ( L. D, M ) (ii) 
where, I = interest rate (%) per month ; L = size of landholdings; 
V = volume of loan taken by the household; D = duration of loan 
(in number of days); and, M = number of male members in the 
household. 
'M* is considered here as the secondary insurance against 
risk. Of course, there is no gender bias; the consideration that 
the male labour force are the only tangible source of income of 
the family is quite strong in the rural society, though there is 
no firm ground of that as the female participation rate is found 
to be substantial. Obviously, the gender fragmentation of the 
credit market would require special attention. 
The results of the multiple linear regression exercise (Table 
5) show that the equation with 'V as the dependent variable is 
statistically significant while that with T does not hold good. 
Further, apart from the partial correlation coefficient of V 
(volume of loan) with D (duration), after L and M have been 
allowed its effect, no other relationships in either of the 
equations has a statistically significant't' value. Moreover, the 
partial correlation coefficients, except R ^ |3, are hardly any 
improvement over the simple correlations. 
In regression equation (ii), the intercorrelation of L 
(landholdings) and M (male members) is found to be statistically 
significant. However, asR2v>R2LM, i. e., by applying Kleins rule, 
the problem of multicollinearity is not found to be serious. 
IV. The perspective 
The official credit market is not! sealed to many of the 
borrowers who enter the informal market. They have 
entitlements to the kinds of collateral demanded by the official 
market. Yet because of the transactions-costly paper works 
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required, the time-lag needed between the application and the 
sanction of the credit, and not to speak of corruption8 the 
borrowers turn to the informal market. The informal market, 
on the other hand, is also selective as regards the various 
collaterals as securities. Thus it is not simply the acceptability 
of the collateral that distinguishes the markets. Moreover, the 
'purpose of loan' too, is not a significant criterion of segmentation. 
It is not very easy to make distinction between consumption 
loans and loans taken for productive purposes.9 A peasant 
household might have paid the wage-bills to the hired labourers, 
for certain reasons, in grains, out of the domestic inventory for 
consumption, thus exhausted it and, in turn, looked forward 
to a grain loan, or cash loan to buy its own consumption 
requirements for the rest of the period till harvesting. Further, 
so far as the determination of interest rate is concerned, 
calculations based on 'opportunity cost' are valid so long as the 
mobility of capital in between organized and unorganized 
markets is a real phenomenon. For the local trader cum lender, 
the opportunity cost of the loanable funds might enter into his/ 
her economic calculations. On the other hand, for a risk--
aversed widow (one who happens to be a lender also) in an 
agriculturist household, the calculation can at best be based 
upon the maximum interest income that she would have 
earned, for instance, from the local organized sector bank and 
which hovers around 10-12 per cent per annum on a fixed term 
deposit for a year. 
In addition to the operational disadvantages of the organized 
lending institutions the 'populist' measures of the government 
such as, the waiving of all repayment obligations without there 
being any significant reason like natural calamities, also 
prompts distortions in the aggregate credit market. The 
borrowers expect the imminent announcement of such kind of 
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waiving thereby postponing repayment, while the banks find it 
risky to sanction additional credit particularly below^ertain 
limits that qualified for redemption, last time when it took 
place. The volume of per capita credit requirement is generally 
found to be low. Therefore while the banks usually try to 
shun small lendings the private occasional lenders constitute 
the alternative market (Table 6). The regions where non-farm 
activities have acquired relative significance the lenders are 
found to be more heterogeneous. However, the heterogeneity 
has not yielded to the law of single price. The professional 
lender, substantial peasant, or the mahajans assume 
importance when individual borrowers need larger volumes of 
credit, or the frequency of borrowing is high. Not all types of 
collateral are acceptable to the distinctly different lenders in 
the informal market. Interlinkage is also not a common feature 
of the rural credit market. The substantial peasant cum lender, 
or the grain-dealer cum lender may prefer interlinkage, but the 
professional lender generally does not want to have land or 
labour commitments as the collateral, although interlinkage 
might have yielded higher return to the loanable funds. It is 
thus very obvious that the rural credit market is not 
homogeneous as the models based on monopolies would 
suggest.10 
The professional moneylender generally. asks for such 
types of collateral in which the borrower has complete property 
rights and which are easily saleable, e.g., gold or silver 
ornaments, etc., but not lands. For the landed gentry or 
substantial peasants, on the other hand, the more incomplete 
the property right is over the collateral the more is the incentive; 
khay khalasi is preferred to leasing-in type. In the former credit 
agreement, both land and the labour belong to the borrower yet 
not the output while in the latter the borrower accord only the 
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usufructuary rights. Further, wheathe mahajan accepts 'crop 
in the field' as collateral he in fact accepts incomplete property 
rights; the volatility of production assigns incompleteness to 
the land rights in the sense that the owner does not possess the 
full knowledge of the property which he/she is going to pledge 
as security. 
It is found that the commercial crop ( e.g. sericulture) 
regions have developed a rather strong interlinkage between 
land, labour, credit and output markets. Although the 
calculation of the implicit rate of interest in interlinked 
transactions quite often is tentative one may argue that the rate 
must not be higher than that in C-C transactions, in respective 
regions. Otherwise, the borrower would not have entered into 
a more unequal exchange when comparatively better contract 
is apparently within the reach. However, first, often the borrower 
is not able to tender acceptable collateral such as gold, or silver 
to the professional lender, or land, labour, etc., to other groups 
of lenders. Second, in areas where the mahajans historically 
dominate the local output markets, the economic calculations 
of the common borrowers certainly include the fact of market 
discrimination." Therefore, repayment in kind seems to them 
rather less costly than in cash.12 
On the whole, the informal rural credit market apparently 
though seems to be separated into three distinct sub-sectors, 
viz., 'cash-cash', 'cash-kind' and 'cash-labour', (assuming the 
'kind-kind' as a special case), in fact, they are interlinked 
through the process of interest rate formation, be it implicit or 
explicit, in each of the sub-sectors. 
The interest rate fixed by the rural professional money 
lender seems to be positively associated with the 'trading 
margin* in the rural output markets. The rate of return on 
commercial trading in the rural economy still remains high due 
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to the weak integration of different output markets (see. e.g.. 
Palaskas and Harriss-White, 1993: Banerjee. 1995a) and' 
provides sufficient basis of the high and differential interest 
rates. (The credit-output interlinkage (i. e.. C-K type) would 
further explain the segmentation of the rural output market to 
a great extent. The implicit rate of interest in C-K is determined 
by the lender's 'power' to depress the post-harvest price; to the 
extent under-pricing is possible the implicit interest rate goes 
up. The lender may negotiate at a lower-than C-C rate so as to 
ensure a steady supply of output. But as the number of 
borrowers increases the lender would certainly hike the rate.) 
The transactions costs in C-L being still higher the economic 
calculations of the lender take i&tqaccpunt the minimum rate 
that is available in C-C plus a premium. 
INTEREST 
RATE 
FIGURE 1 
> 
VOLUME 
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in the'C-C'borrowing and repayments, the supply elasticity 
of credit is comparatively higher (curve 'P\ in Figure 1). On the 
other hand, in C-K and C-L the supply is constrained by the 
positive transactions costs of transfer or capture of property 
rights, be it land, output, or right of ownership on borrower's 
own labour (curve T\ in Figure 1).13 The intersection of the two 
curves ('0') is the equilibrium outcome. But the probability of 
disequilibrium outcomes is likely to be high because of the fact 
that both the borrower and lender's choices are limited.14 
To conclude, it is the agrarian output market that plays a 
crucial role in determining the interest rate while the structure 
and specificities of property rights provide stability to the 
system. This takes out attention towards the extant complexities 
of the agrarian market and non-market relations in South Asia. 
Notes 
'Sharecropping, perpetual indebtedness, landowners as lender 
of consumption loans, and inaccessibility of the small 
tenants to the market, have been pointed out as the 
prominent features of'semi-feudal' agriculture. The latter 
allows exploitation based on (a) the landowner's traditional 
property right to land, and (b) landowner's operation of 
usuiy. 
2 The explanation of the observed high rate of interest is that the 
default rate is high and thus the lender should have a 
premium for risk so that he is able to cover his likely loss 
of capital. 
In traditional economies, the problem of default is often 
mitigated by the social and community values. In Kaliachak 
in the district of Malda, for instance, there is a very high 
concentration of Muslim silkworm rearers as well as silk 
yarn reelers. Most of the moneylenders also happen to be 
Muslims. They do not generally demand any collateral as 
18 
securities yet the interest rate is comparatively lower. It is 
the village society which de Jaclo acts as the guarantor 
against any individual defaulter in that society. 
1 need not elaborate on the advantages of the method in a poor 
peasant economy where not only the accounting method is 
quite poor but also due to widespread illiteracy, answers to 
the precise questions (almost in a binary mode) are highly 
unexpected. 
A principal of Rs. 2.000 fetches an interest income of 
Rs. 3,680, in a year. 1 
The total interest burden per annum, at the 7% monthly 
rate of interest, on a sum of Rs. 10,000 turns out to be 
Rs. 8,400. On the other hand, one bigha (=0.33 acre) of 
irrigated land yields three crops in a year (one rabi plus two 
paddy crops). Suppose, the lender cultivates only paddy. 
Then, the annual yields would be about 1,800 kilos, 
fetching at least Rs. 8,000. Assuming the cultivation costs 
tobeRs. 1,500 per crop per bigha, the aggregate costs come 
to around Rs. 4,500 per annum. Thus the lender is able to 
earn only about Rs. 3,500 on the principal, and that too 
provided there were no crop failure or market crash. 
However, if instead, Commercial crop like mulberry is 
planted the annual net return would be much higher. 
cf. Swaminathan (1991). In this study on the two villages 
in Tamil Nadu, the type of collateral accepted as security by 
lenders, and the purpose underlying demand for credit, 
have been identified as the basis for the continued 
segmentation of the credit market. 
Swaminathan (1991), for instance, finds an inverse relation-
ship between the value of land owned and the average rate 
of interest in the two selected villages in Tamil Nadu. 
It is observed that the rural elites quite often have been 
able to bend the government's soft loan schemes meant for 
19 
the poor, in their favour. The institutional loanable funds 
often find its ways to the elites who then utilize the same 
as their own loanable funds in the informal market. The 
banks sometimes find it cost-effective as compared to 
maintaining numerous small accounts. 
9 The borrower in the informal market is not required to 
state the purpose of the loan. The formal sector is equally 
indifferent to the utilization of loans unless the loan is A 
specified, as part of any government soft loan scheme, for 
priority projects. 
10 The typical borrower could offer the kind of collateral as 
securities that are not acceptable in the organized credit 
market. But since the lenders in the informal credit market 
accept such collateral they could enforce certain 
'monopolistic' contracts like unilateral valuation of the 
collateral, high (usurious) interest rate, shorter repayment 
period, etc. 
11 Apparently, the interlinkages are beneficial to both the 
borrower and the lender, as argued by Gangopadhyay 
(1994). 
12 In fact, this is how they calculate comparative costs: a rupee 
equivalent of paddy is considered as less valuable than a 
rupee, in currency. 
13 For a relatively small amount of individual loan, normally the 
borrower would not be inclined towards interlinked 
transactions. 
14 In a sense, it may closely resemble to von Stackelberg's 
duopoly model (1952). TheVandVcurves may be interpreted 
as the reaction functions of the two duopolists. Both of 
them are sophisticated, want to act as leaders and 
establish social hegemony. But, because of the transactions 
costs which are not easily negotiable, the disequilibrium is 
likely to persist despite economic warfare. 
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